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Despite the diverse and developed nature of twentieth century U.S. and Canadian ﬁnancial
markets, the history of both economies is replete with claims of ineﬃciency and inadequacy
among ﬁnancial intermediaries, particularly the banking sectors. In Canada it has been argued
that banks were oligopolistic and favoured an entrenched merchant class over industrialists. In
the U.S. the unit banking system has been perceived as unstable and of an ineﬃciently small
scale. This paper examines the experiences of a set of ﬁrms from a large and economically
important manufacturing industry; primary steel production; in an eﬀort to determine the
impact diﬀerences in macro ﬁnancial markets have had on micro ﬁnancial decision making.
We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant, but not necessarily economically important, relationships
among national capital market characteristics, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions, and ﬁrms’ capital
costs.
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation: N42, N62, G32.1 Introduction
“It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a greater part
of that capital active and productive than would otherwise be so, that the most
judicious operations of banking can increase the industry of the country.” (Adam
Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776, Pg. 419.)
The role played by ﬁnancial intermediaries in promoting economic development and in-
dustrialization has been studied by economists for over 200 years. The correlation between
ﬁnancial and economic development is well established, but the relative importance of the
diﬀerent directions of causation, and the channels thereof, remain at issue.1 In this paper we
investigate the relationship between U.S. and Canadian ﬁnancial markets and the ﬁnancing
decisions made by U.S. and Canadian steel producers during the years 1910-1990.
Twentieth century U.S. and Canadian capital markets and steel producers have been cho-
sen for study as much for their similarities, as for their diﬀerences. Throughout our period
of study U.S. and Canadian ﬁnancial development, industrial structure, technological capa-
bilities, productivity and income performance were very similar. The steel industries in both
countries were large, and the intermediate nature of their output made them economically
important. In addition, the steel ﬁrms in both the United States and Canada produced a rel-
atively homogeneous product, with similar technology and common inputs.2 The cross-border
comparison is illuminating because, despite these common economic, industrial and ﬁnancial
features, the unique characteristics of the two countries’ capital markets have had an impact
on the ﬁnancing decisions made by their steel ﬁrms, which in turn have had an impact on
the ﬁrms’ capital costs. Our ability to identify relationships among capital market, balance
sheet, and capital cost variables, using U.S. and Canadian steel producers as a case study,
suggests that a comparison of more diverse industries and nations is likely to reveal even more
economically substantive eﬀects.
In Section 2 we brieﬂy review the structure of the ﬁnancial markets in the United States and
Canada through the twentieth century. In particular, we show that U.S. stock and bond mar-
1The seminal quantitative research on links between ﬁnancial markets and economic growth includes Patrick,
1966, and Goldsmith, 1969. More recently King and Levin, 1993, Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998, Allen and Gale,
2000, and Fohlin, 2000, have empirically sifted through the various hypotheses. Levine, 1997, provides a survey
of this branch of literature.
2Keay, 2000A, Table 2 and 4, compares twentieth century Canadian and U.S. income and productivity
performance.
1kets were larger and more active than Canadian stock and bond markets during the 1910-1990
period. The U.S. and Canadian banking sectors were the largest single ﬁnancial intermediaries
in the two countries, but the Canadian sector was slightly larger, and slightly more active in
the corporate capital market. Although quantitatively small, these cross-border diﬀerences
were statistically distinct.
In Section 3 we document the diﬀerences between the U.S. and Canadian steel ﬁrms’
ﬁnancing decisions. Using balance sheet and income account data from seven U.S. and four
Canadian steel producers over the years 1910-1990, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their
ﬁnancing decisions. The U.S. ﬁrms used more formal, long term debt and more retained
earnings than their Canadian counterparts. The Canadian ﬁrms, on the other hand, used
more formal stock issues and more short term debt.
In the fourth section we seek to isolate the relationships between the observed diﬀerences in
balance sheet composition, national capital market characteristics, ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics
and macroeconomic variables. We argue that the unique features of the national capital
markets can explain some, but not all of the balance sheet diﬀerences. Similarly, ﬁrm speciﬁc
and macroeconomic variables can explain some, but not all of the balance sheet diﬀerences.
In Section 5 we analyse the relationship between the payments made to the ﬁrms’ capital
owners and their ﬁnancing decisions. There were signiﬁcant cross-border diﬀerences in govern-
ment and corporate bond yields, common stocks’ dividend-price ratios and the ﬁrms’ realized
capital costs. The U.S. ﬁrms paid their capital owners more, per dollar invested, than the
Canadian ﬁrms, despite the fact that the cost of capital from formal stock and bond markets
in the U.S. was relatively low. Although we can identify a signiﬁcant relationship between
balance sheet composition and payments made to the ﬁrms’ capital owners, this relationship
was quantitatively small.
Based on the evidence presented in this paper it is apparent that, in wealthy, industrialized
economies with relatively developed economic, industrial and ﬁnancial institutions, inﬂuences
that are, at best, only indirectly aﬀected by ﬁnancial characteristics may dwarf the eﬀects
of capital market structure on the cost of capital, and hence, economic growth. Despite this
conclusion, we argue that (assumed) exogenous capital market characteristics aﬀected how
Canadian and U.S. steel ﬁrms ﬁnanced their investment in a statistically signiﬁcant way, and
these choices had an impact on realized capital costs. Therefore, we suggest that a comparison
of more diverse industries and nations is likely to reveal stronger and more economically
2relevant connections between ﬁnancial development and industrialization.
2 Financial Markets in the United States and Canada
In his presidential address at the 2001 Economic History Association Meetings, Richard Sylla
argued that the deﬁning features of a nation’s ﬁnancial system include the presence of a central
bank, a national-convertible currency, limited liability corporations, non-bank intermediaries,
a robust banking sector, and active securities markets. Through most of the twentieth century
the U.S. and Canada were virtually indistinguishable on the basis of the ﬁrst four features. The
key diﬀerences, therefore, between the U.S. and Canadian ﬁnancial systems were the unique
characteristics of the nations’ banking industries; Canada has had a relatively stable branch
banking system, in contrast to the unit banking system of the U.S.; and the greater depth of
U.S. formal securities markets; both stock and bond.3 In this section we present evidence in
support of this distinction between the U.S. and Canadian national capital markets.
In both the United States and Canada the banking sectors have played a much larger role
in the transfer of funds from savers to borrowers than any other single ﬁnancial intermediary.
On average over the years 1900-1990, U.S. commercial bank assets equalled 57.6% of G.N.P.,
while Canadian chartered bank assets exceeded 62.5% of G.N.P..4 Other large intermediaries
in the two countries, such as life insurance companies, have had total assets valued at less than
20% of G.N.P., on average. Furthermore, in contrast to other banking systems, such as those
in Germany and Japan, banks in both Canada and the U.S. operated as commercial rather
than investment institutions. Figure 1 illustrates the ratio of U.S. and Canadian bank assets
relative to G.N.P., for the years 1900-1990. Figure 2 illustrates the ratio of U.S. and Canadian
life insurance company assets relative to G.N.P., for the years 1900-1990.
Insert Figure 1-3
Despite these similarities, there were important cross-border diﬀerences in the Canadian
and U.S. banking systems. In contrast to the thousands of small, non-branching U.S. banks,
the Canada system typically had less than ﬁfteen large, branching banks. In part as a result
3These two features may be linked. Davis and Cull (1994) have argued that the regulation of the U.S.
banking sector led to a greater reliance on, and hence development of, securities markets in the U.S..
4The cross-country diﬀerences in bank, stock and bond activity illustrated in Figure 1-6 and Table 1 are
statistically signiﬁcant, with at least 90% conﬁdence. A complete Data Appendix, containing details of the
construction and sources for all series employed in this paper, is available from the authors. The data sources
have not been listed among the references provided at the end of this paper.
3Table 1: National Capital Market Summary Statistics
Canada U.S.
(σ) (σ)
Total Bank Assets/GNP 0.625 0.576
(0.147) (0.069)
Life Insurance Assets/GNP 0.199 0.194
(0.102) (0.069)
Number of Banks 14.363 17810.490
(8.558) (5751.586)
Bank Oﬃces/Capita 0.312 0.190
(0.076) (0.055)
Corporate Bank Loans/GNP 0.049 0.022
(0.029) (0.015)
Corporate Stocks/GNP 0.012 0.009
(0.010) (0.009)
Value Shares Traded/GNP 0.007 0.147
(0.004) (0.100)
Corporate Bonds/GNP 0.021 0.026
(0.013) (0.014)
Note 1: Arithmetic averages over the years 1910-1990, σ =Standard deviation.
Note 2: Bank oﬃces/capita=bank oﬃces per 1000 individuals.
Note 3: Value shares traded/GNP covers years 1934-1990 only.
Note 4: With the exception of life insurance assets/GNP, all U.S. series are statistically signiﬁcantly distinct
from Canadian series, with at least 90% conﬁdence.
of this structure, the Canadian banking system was exceptionally stable during the twentieth
century. The U.S. system, on the other hand, experienced many bank failures, particularly
in the 1920s, 1930s, and again in the 1970s.5 A second diﬀerence has been in the extent to
which banks played a role in corporate ﬁnance. Figure 3 shows U.S. and Canadian corporate
lending by commercial/chartered banks, relative to G.N.P.. We can see that Canadian banks
have played a more active role in corporate lending, compared to their U.S. counterparts. New
corporate bank loans averaged 4.9% of G.N.P. in Canada, versus 2.2% in the U.S., over the
1910-1990 period.
Turning our attention to formal stock markets, somewhat to our surprise, we ﬁnd that
gross issues of new common and preferred shares by Canadian ﬁrms totalled over 1.2% of
G.N.P., averaged over the 1910-1990 period. U.S. ﬁrms issued new shares totalling only 0.9%
of G.N.P., averaged over the same period. From Figure 4, which reports the ratio of gross new
corporate share issues to G.N.P., we can see that the diﬀerence can be traced almost entirely
to the gap in new issues relative to G.N.P. after World War 2. It also appears that many of
5Bordo, Rockoﬀ and Redish, 1994, contrast the stability and eﬃciency of the Canadian and U.S. banking
systems over the twentieth century.
4the shares formally issued by Canadian ﬁrms must have been traded on exchanges outside the
country, most likely in the U.S. From Figure 5 we can see that the value of shares traded on all
registered exchanges in the U.S., relative to G.N.P., far outweighed the value of shares traded
on the Montreal, Toronto and Canadian stock exchanges. Over the years 1934-1990 shares
traded on U.S. exchanges exceeded 14.7% of G.N.P., while on Canadian exchanges the value of
shares traded averaged just 0.7% of G.N.P.. Canadian ﬁrms seem to have relied more heavily
on formal stock markets, relative to the U.S. ﬁrms, but these markets were not necessarily
domestic.
Insert Figure 4-5
Finally, looking at the role of bond markets in the two countries, the overall picture is one
of slightly greater reliance on bond ﬁnance in the U.S., relative to Canada. Averaged over the
1910-1990 period, new corporate bond issues equalled 2.6% of U.S. G.N.P., compared to only
2.1% of Canadian G.N.P.. However, from Figure 6 we can see that this diﬀerence was driven
by the junk bond era in the U.S.. Prior to the 1980s U.S. corporate bond issues were more
volatile than Canadian issues, but the time series patterns are remarkably similar.
Insert Figure 6
In summary, Canadian banks have been relatively large and active in corporate ﬁnance,
Canadian ﬁrms have relied to a greater extent on stock markets, although domestic exchanges
have been small, and U.S. ﬁrms have had access to deeper bond markets.6 These distinct
diﬀerences between the U.S. and Canadian national capital markets have not gone unnoticed
by those who have sought to draw connections between economic development and ﬁnancial
intermediation.
In Canada, commentators have argued that the “immature and undeveloped” domestic
capital market has starved manufacturers of long term, stable sources of capital. The concern
is that the absence of large and eﬃcient stock and bond markets, coupled with discrimination
by an oligopolistic banking sector, has forced domestic producers to rely on short term and
informal sources for their capital. Canadian ﬁrms, therefore, may have had to pay higher risk
premia and transactions costs associated with these sources, and their growth may have been
6These ﬁndings are broadly consistent Baskin and Miranti’s, 1997, study of the evolution of U.S. securities
markets, and with O.E.C.D. ﬁgures for non-ﬁnancial enterprises over the period 1970-1985, reported in Mayer,
1989.
5retarded as a result.7 The evidence presented in subsequent sections of this paper does not
support this view.8
Canadians’ fear that the domestic banking sector has constrained economic growth and
industrialization due to its oligopolistic and discriminatory behaviour is not unique. Bliss
(1987, Pg. 245) has argued that Canadian banks were, “...no more opposed to industrial
development...than (banks) in the United States or Great Britain.” The tight regulatory
control and branch banking that contributed to Canadians’ concerns are exactly the features
of the system that U.S. commentators have suggested reduced risk and dampened cyclical
behaviour in the Canadian capital market. These same commentators have argued that the
U.S. banking sector should bear a considerable burden of blame for some of the more dramatic
economic ﬂuctuations in the twentieth century; the Great Depression during the 1930s, and
the savings and loan crisis during the 1980s, to name just two.9
It is apparent that both increased volatility and constrained growth have been attributed
to the distinctive features of the U.S. and Canadian national capital markets. For these claims,
and their underlying theoretical hypotheses, to have merit their empirical foundations must be
robust. In particular, even if there is little to distinguish the two nations’ ﬁnancial markets, we
should be able to identify signiﬁcant relationships between their banking systems and securities
markets, the ﬁnancial instruments chosen by their ﬁrms, and, through a capital cost channel,
the investment performance of their ﬁrms.
3 The Composition of the Firms’ Balance Sheets
Over the period 1910-1990 the U.S. and Canadian manufacturing sectors generated 20-30% of
their nation’s G.N.P.. The primary iron and steel industries in the two countries accounted for
approximately 10-20% of manufacturing value added. The U.S. and Canadian iron and steel
industries operated in very concentrated, possibly oligopolistic, output markets. In Canada,
four steel producers; Steel Company of Canada (later Stelco), Dominion Foundry and Steel
Company (later Dofasco), Algoma Steel Company, and Dominion Steel and Coal Company
(later Dosco); dominated the industry throughout the twentieth century. Over three quarters
7Proponents of this view include Buckley, 1955, Naylor, 1975, Rudin, 1982, and Taylor and Baskerville, 1994.
8Critics of the the Canadian capital market failure hypothesis include Drummond, 1962 and 1987, Neufeld,
1972, and Evans and Quigley, 1990.
9There is a considerable body of literature linking events in the U.S. banking sector and the decline in output
during the Great Depression. The seminal works include Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, and Bernanke, 1983.
Others have studied the role played by securities markets in the economic collapse of the 1930s. For an example
see White, 1990.
6of Canada’s steel output was produced by one of these four ﬁrms, on average. In the U.S.,
the steel industry was also highly concentrated. Seven ﬁrms; United States Steel, Bethlehem
Steel, Inland Steel, Republic Steel, National Steel, American Rolling Mills (later Armco), and
Jones and Laughlin (later J. and L.); dominated the U.S. industry to the same extent that the
Canadian producers dominated their domestic market.10 We have chosen to use this industry
as the basis for a comparison of Canadian and U.S. manufacturers’ capital ﬁnancing decisions
because the steel producers in the U.S. and Canada made up one of the largest individual
industries, their supply of intermediate inputs made them vital to the overall performance of
their nation’s manufacturing sectors, they employed very similar technologies, they experienced
very similar total factor productivity performance11, they produced products that were close
substitutes for one another, and, perhaps most importantly, appropriate data exists over a
long time period on a consistent basis.12
Steel producers must raise funds to acquire and accumulate plant, machinery and equip-
ment. There are many potential sources for these funds. Firms may use their retained earnings
that have been accumulated from past years’ proﬁts, they may borrow from banks, other ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries, their suppliers, governments and, in some cases, their employees, or
they may sell various types of bonds and stocks domestically and abroad. Each producer’s
choice amongst these potential sources of capital will depend on characteristics of that ﬁrm’s
economic environment, which may, or may not, be shared with other producers in the same
industry, region, or nation. In this section we argue that over the 1910-1990 period the four
Canadian steel producers in our sample were choosing amongst their potential sources of cap-
ital in a way that was statistically signiﬁcantly distinct from the choices being made by the
seven U.S. steel producers.
Because each ﬁrm made idiosyncratic and ﬂuid capital ﬁnancing decisions, comparing all
potential sources over the entire period is infeasible. Given the data we have access to, we can
group capital sources for each ﬁrm, in each year, into four consistently deﬁned, and comparable
categories.
• Short term debt includes all debt due within 365 days of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial year-end.
10For more speciﬁc information about the industry and sectoral coverage these eleven ﬁrms represent see
Keay, 1999, Chapter 2.3.
11Keay, 2000B, compares the technology employed by Canadian and U.S. steel ﬁrms and their T.F.P. perfor-
mance over the 1910-1990 period.
12This work is part of an ongoing project. In the future we hope to add more ﬁrms and industries to our
sample in an eﬀort to improve sectoral coverage.





Short Term Debt/Assets 0.102 0.070
(0.044) (0.039)
Long Term Debt/Assets 0.164 0.202
(0.070) (0.064)
Retained Earnings/Assets 0.402 0.419
(0.153) (0.175)
Capital Stock/Assets 0.333 0.308
(0.143) (0.167)
Note: Unweighted arithmetic averages across years and ﬁrms, σ =Standard Deviation.
Within this category are sources of capital such as short term bank loans, accounts
payable; which include resources lent to the ﬁrm by their suppliers; and all debt due
within one year; which includes all other short term loans, as well as long term debt that
is coming due within one year.
• Long term debt includes all funded debt, bonded debt, and long term debt. Within this
category are sources of capital such as long term bank loans and funds raised on formal
bond markets.
• Retained earnings include the stock of all accumulated variable proﬁt that has not been
paid out to the ﬁrms’ owners. Within this category are reserve funds such as depreciation
reserves, tax reserves, pension reserves, special reserves accumulated for speciﬁc projects,
and surplus or excess reserves.
• Financial capital stock includes all funds raised through the issuance of common and
preferred shares on formal stock markets.
For each ﬁrm, in each year, the sum of these four categories is, by construction, equal to the
ﬁrms’ total assets. Each ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio can be measured as short term plus long term
debt, divided by retained earnings plus ﬁnancial capital stock.
Table 2 reports unweighted arithmetic averages and standard deviations for the four Cana-
dian ﬁrms’ and seven U.S. ﬁrms’ debt-equity, short term debt-assets, long term debt-assets,
retained earnings-assets, and ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios. If we looked only at the
debt-equity ratios, then the Canadian and the U.S. ﬁrms look remarkably similar. When av-
8eraged across the ﬁrms, the Canadians relied on debt to a slightly greater extent than their
U.S. counterparts, at the mean of the data. However, when we separate debt into short and
long term, and equity into retained earnings and ﬁnancial capital stock, we ﬁnd quite dramatic
diﬀerences between the Canadian and the U.S. ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. In particular, the
Canadian ﬁrms’ mean short term debt-assets ratio was over 45.7% greater than the U.S. ﬁrms’
mean ratio, while the Canadian ﬁrms’ long term debt-assets ratio was over 18.8% smaller than
the U.S. ﬁrms’ ratio, at the mean of the data.13 Short term debt ﬂows from short term bank
loans, loans from other intermediaries, loans from suppliers, and loans from other informal
sources of capital. It is associated with relatively high risk premia and transactions costs.
Long term debt, on the other hand, ﬂows from stable, formal sources, such as bond markets,
that are associated with mature and developed capital markets. Therefore, the relative distri-
bution of debt described in Table 2 is what one would expect to ﬁnd if Canadian banks have
been reluctant to make long term commitments to domestic industrialists, and Canadian bond
markets have been small and ineﬃcient.
Insert Figure 7-8
While the restrained use of short term debt by the U.S. ﬁrms is consistent with the presence
of a large and eﬃcient bond market, the greater use of retained earnings is consistent with the
presence of an unstable and ineﬃcient stock market. The Canadian ﬁrms in our sample had
ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios that were over 8.1% higher than the U.S. ﬁrms’ ratios, and
retained earnings-assets ratios that were almost 4.1% lower, at the mean of the data. Given the
size of the stock markets in the two countries, we expected to ﬁnd that the Canadian producers
had been unable, or unwilling, to use share issues as a substantial source of funds, relative to
the U.S. producers. The evidence in Table 2 undermines this expectation and suggests that
the U.S. ﬁrms must have been more reluctant, or constrained in their use formal stock markets
as a source of investment funds.14
Insert Figure 9-10
Figures 7-10 illustrate Canadian and U.S. short term debt-assets, long term debt-assets,
retained earnings-assets, and ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios, averaged across the ﬁrms in
13A greater reliance on short term debt by the Canadian ﬁrms is consistent with qualitative evidence reported
in ﬁrm histories. See Kilbourn, 1960, Pg. 129 and 224, or McDowall, 1984, Pg. 141-142 and 157.
14Tsurumi, 2001, found that, relative to Japanese ﬁrms, turn of the twentieth century U.S. manufacturers
relied to a greater extent on formal bond markets, rather than stock markets, to fund their investment.
9each nation, in each year. In general, we can see that the mean U.S. and mean Canadian
ratios have had quite similar time series patterns over the twentieth century. The reliance on
short term debt has been increasing among ﬁrms in both nations since World War 2, while
the reliance on formal share issues has been falling over the same period. The use of long
term debt has followed a “U” shaped time series pattern, while the use of retained earnings
has followed an inverted “U” shaped time series pattern. Despite the fact that the U.S. ﬁrms
were increasing their use of short and long term debt throughout most of the post-World War
2 era, after 1950 the Canadian ﬁrms employed debt ﬁnancing to a greater extent in almost
every year.15
Prior to an investigation of the relationship between the observed diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
ratios and capital market characteristics, we must conﬁrm that our casual comparisons of
the means and time series patterns reported in Table 2 and Figure 7-10 are not providing
a deceptive picture of the evolution of the ratios over the entire period. The presence of
statistically signiﬁcant time trends in the Canadian relative to U.S. ratios, and fairly large
standard deviations among the individual series, suggest that more formal statistical tests are
required.
The micro-data form a cross section of eleven ﬁrms, with an unbalanced time series that
spans as many as 88 years (1902-1990 for United States Steel) and as few as 54 years (1936-1990
for Algoma Steel). As we would expect, equation by equation tests, with each of the ratios
reported in Table 2 representing an individual equation, reveal the presence of cross-panel
heteroskedasticity. The need to perform statistical tests on a nation speciﬁc dummy suggests
that a ﬁxed eﬀects correction for cross-panel heteroskedasticity is inappropriate. Therefore,
prior to estimation, the data have been transformed to facilitate a random eﬀects correction
for cross-panel heteroskedasticity.16 Intuitively, the random eﬀects transformation involves
the calculation of a weighted average of within panel and between panel eﬀects. This implies
that our transformation requires the determination of the relative importance of each of these
eﬀects. We have derived the required weights from initial equation by equation random eﬀects
15The increasing use of debt ﬁnancing after 1950 reﬂects a common trend among a broader cross section of
U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms. See Ciccolo, 1982, Pg. 70 and Table 4.5.
16The econometric techniques employed throughout this paper have been drawn primarily from Greene, 1990,
Chapters 14, 16, 17. Equation by equation Hausman speciﬁcation tests do not call into question the use of a
random eﬀects approach at any standard level of signiﬁcance.
10estimates.17
yijt
0 = yijt − b θ¯ yij (1)
i =ﬁrm identiﬁer; j =nation identiﬁer; t =time identiﬁer; yijt
0 =vector of transformed variables
(including dependent, independent and constant variables); yijt =vector of untransformed
variables; b θ =within/between weight derived with initial equation by equation estimation;
¯ yij =vector of ﬁrm speciﬁc means.
The transformation of the data, rather than direct equation by equation random eﬀects
estimates, is necessary because we have assumed that the ﬁrms in our sample chose among
their four possible sources for capital simultaneously. The alternative would be an iterative
and independent decision making process. If our assumption is consistent with reality, then
the short term debt-assets, long term debt-assets, retained earnings-assets and ﬁnancial capital
stock-assets ratios have been jointly determined, and they must be estimated as a system of
seemingly unrelated regressions.18 We have employed an iterative feasible generalized least
squares technique in the estimation of the system. This technique yields results that are
equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation.
For Test 1 we seek to identify unconditional statistically signiﬁcant cross-country diﬀerences
in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial ratios. In the system of four equations19 used in Test 1, short term debt-
assets, long term debt-assets, retained earnings-assets and ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios
have been regressed on a constant and a dummy that takes the value one for the four Canadian
ﬁrms.20
(Sterm/Assets)0
ijt = C20 + β2candum0
t + e2t (2)
(Lterm/Assets)0
ijt = C30 + β3candum0
t + e3t (3)
(RE/Assets)0
ijt = C40 + β4candum0
t + e4t (4)
(Kstk/Assets)0
ijt = C50 + β5candum0
t + e5t (5)
17This approach introduces some unknown degree of ineﬃciency into our estimates. Unfortunately, it is the
only feasible technique, given our data and the issues we seek to address.
18Breusch-Pagan tests conﬁrm that, at any standard level of signiﬁcance, the equations within the systems
estimated for this paper are not independent. Tests for equation speciﬁc autocorrelation can be rejected at
standard signiﬁcance levels, except where noted.
19Debt-equity ratios have not been included in the system. If we believe that the ﬁrms chose among their four
sources for capital simultaneously, then the inclusion of the debt-equity equation is superﬂuous. The qualitative
results continue to hold with the inclusion of the debt-equity equation.
20Because of the data transformation, all four equations can be included in the system. Theoretically, only
three of the four equations are linearly independent. The systems have also been run using only three equations
at a time. The qualitative conclusions reported in this section are independent of the choice of equations
included in the systems.
11Table 3: Testing for Unconditional Statistically Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences in Financial Instruments
Test 1: c βx
(P Value)
Short Term Debt/Assets: 0.038
(0.015)






Note: See equations (2) - (5) in text. Unconditional statistically signiﬁcant parameter estimates indicate
domestically unique ﬁnancial ratios.
From Test 1, in Table 3, we can see that the estimated parameters on the dummy variables
are statistically signiﬁcant, with at least 95% conﬁdence, for the short term debt-assets, long
term debt-assets and retained earnings-assets ratios, but not for the ﬁnancial capital stock-
assets ratio.21 This implies that the Canadian steel producers have traditionally chosen to
ﬁnance their capital in a manner that has been signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the decisions made
by their U.S. counterparts, except with respect to their use of common and preferred shares.
Although we have some reservations with respect to equity ﬁnancing, it appears that the
U.S. ﬁrms have ﬁnanced their investment diﬀerently than the Canadian ﬁrms, with the most
obvious diﬀerence being the U.S. ﬁrms’ reluctance to use short term debt. We can statistically
test the hypotheses that capital market characteristics, ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics, or ag-
gregate macroeconomic performance contributed signiﬁcantly to these observed cross-country
diﬀerences in balance sheet composition.
4 Explaining Balance Sheet Composition
4.1 Capital Market Characteristics
The economic environment in which each of the eleven steel producers included in our sample
made their capital ﬁnancing decisions were time, ﬁrm, and nation dependent. These decisions
were idiosyncratic, and the determinants of these decisions may also have been idiosyncratic.
Therefore, we should expect the importance the ﬁrms placed on various explanatory variables
to have varied widely across the sample, even within each country, and varied across time for
21Complete econometric results are available from the authors for all regressions, and for the speciﬁcation,
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests described in this paper.
12each ﬁrm. This implies that it is unlikely that any single determinant, including the conditions
within the U.S. and the Canadian capital markets, should explain all of the observed cross-
country variation in ﬁnancing decisions.
To formally test for a relationship between (assumed) exogenous domestic capital market
characteristics and the capital ﬁnancing decisions made by the eleven steel producers in our
sample22, we have returned to the equation systems described in Section 3. We use our cross
section-unbalanced time series data to estimate systems of four equations. The data have been
transformed to facilitate a random eﬀects correction for cross panel heteroskedasticity prior to
the use of an iterative feasible generalized least squares technique to estimate each system. We
regress short term debt-assets, long term debt-assets, retained earnings-assets, and ﬁnancial
capital stock-assets ratios on a constant, a dummy that takes the value one for the Canadian
ﬁrms, and a matrix of control variables.
(Sterm/Assets)0
ijt = C60 + β6candum0
t + α6X0
ijt + e6t (6)
(Lterm/Assets)0
ijt = C70 + β7candum0
t + α7X0
ijt + e7t (7)
(RE/Assets)0
ijt = C80 + β8candum0
t + α8X0
ijt + e8t (8)
(Kstk/Assets)0
ijt = C90 + β9candum0
t + α9X0
ijt + e9t (9)
α = vector of parameters to be estimated; X0
jt = matrix of control variables.
We perform three separate tests for the presence of relationships between U.S. and Cana-
dian balance sheets and capital market characteristics. Each test controls for a diﬀerent matrix
of U.S. and Canadian capital market features. In Test 2 our matrix of control variables in-
cludes new issues of corporate bank loans, new issues of corporate bonds and new issues of
corporate stocks in the U.S. and Canada. Intuitively, this test seeks to determine if diﬀerences
in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions remain signiﬁcant after controlling for diﬀerences in U.S. and
Canadian bank, bond market and stock market activity in the corporate capital market.
New corporate bank loans, and bond and stock issues have limited explanatory power in
equations (6) - (9). However, controlling for cross border diﬀerences in these variables does
have an eﬀect on the idiosyncracy of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. After controlling for the
scale of bank, bond and stock market activity on corporate capital markets, we continue to
22Because the ﬁrms in our sample were a large but incomplete share of the industry they represent, this
industry comprised less than 20% of the nations’ manufacturing sectors, and the manufacturing sectors were
less than one quarter of the aggregate economy, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that our national
capital market variables were exogenous, while the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial instruments were endogenous.
13Table 4: Testing for Statistically Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences in Financial Instruments, Conditional
on Capital Market Characteristics
Test 2: c βx Test 3: c βx Test 4: c βx
(P Value) (P Value) (P Value)
Short Term Debt/Assets: 0.020 0.032 0.036
(0.246) (0.040) (0.006)
Long Term Debt/Assets: -0.065 -0.019 -0.023
(0.000) (0.204) (0.133)
Retained Earnings/Assets: -0.042 -0.155 -0.036
(0.379) (0.000) (0.171)
Capital Stock/Assets: 0.018 0.010 0.001
(0.481) (0.714) (0.963)
Note: A statistically signiﬁcant parameter estimate indicates domestically unique ﬁnancial ratios conditional
on capital market conditions.
Test 2: Controlling for corporate bank loans, bond issues and stock issues.
Test 3: Controlling for bank assets, life insurance company assets and an aggregate risk premium.
Test 4: Controlling for corporate bond and stock issues, bank assets, life insurance company assets and an
aggregate risk premium.
observe statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the long term debt-assets ratios, but there are
no longer statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the short term debt-assets, retained earnings-
assets, or ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios. The estimated parameters on candum0
t, and
their p values, from Test 2 are reported in Table 4.
In our third test we seek to expand the scope of our deﬁnition of capital market charac-
teristics. In this test we employ more general control variables; total bank assets relative to
G.N.P., total life insurance assets relative to G.N.P., and a risk premium, equal to the dif-
ference between the average corporate bond yield and the average government bond yield in
the two countries.23 Intuitively, we are testing for the presence of statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in balance sheet composition even after controlling for conditions in the two nations’
aggregate capital markets.
The more general capital market proxies’ explanatory power is also weak in equations (6)-
(9). In contrast to Test 2, after controlling for diﬀerences in the size of the banking sector,
the size of the life insurance sector, and a risk premium in the U.S. and Canada, there remain
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the Canadian and the U.S. ﬁrms’ short term debt-assets
and retained earnings-assets ratios, but not in their long term debt-assets or ﬁnancial capital
23We have not included the number of banks or the number of bank oﬃces per capita amongst the explanatory
variables in Test 3 because the series are closely correlated to bank assets relative to G.N.P.. We have not
included the value of shares traded on formal exchanges relative to G.N.P. amongst the explanatory variables
in Test 3 because the series covers only the years 1934-1990. Tests including these series produce results that
are qualitatively consistent with those reported in this paper.
14stock-assets ratios. The estimated parameters on candum0
t, and their p values, from Test 3
are reported in Table 4.
As a ﬁnal test of the inﬂuence domestic capital market characteristics have had on the
steel producers’ ﬁnancial decisions, we control for corporate bank loans, bond market and
stock market activity, the size of life insurance companies, and a risk premium for the two
countries.24
In Table 4 the estimated parameters on candum0
t, and their p values, from Test 4 are
reported. Again, there are statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerences between three of the four
ﬁnancial ratios. After controlling for activity on the corporate capital market, and for general
capital market conditions, we can identify a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
Canadian and the U.S. steel producers’ short term debt-assets ratio, but not between their
long term debt-assets, retained earnings-assets or ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios.
From Test 2-4 we can see that diﬀerences in U.S. and Canadian capital markets can explain
only a sub-set of the observed diﬀerences in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. Are there other
determinants that might be more important? To answer this question we have tested two
possible alternative explanations for the observed cross border variations in ﬁnancing decisions;
ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics, including size, age, ﬁnancial distress and ownership type, and
macroeconomic conditions, including aggregate and industry performance.25
4.2 Firm Speciﬁc Characteristics and Macroeconomic Variables
Access to formal, stable capital markets is a function of a ﬁrm’s reputation and how investors
perceive its performance. Reputation and perceived performance is based at least in part on a
ﬁrm’s ability to survive and grow, relative to its competitors. Therefore, we have included ﬁrm
size as a control variable in our system of four equations to test the possibility that the larger
producers have been favoured on more formal, stable capital markets, and this has led to the
24We have left out the variables which are closely correlated with bank activity in the corporate capital
market; the share of total bank assets relative to G.N.P., the number of banks and the number of bank oﬃces
per capita; and the truncated value of shares traded on domestic exchanges relative to G.N.P. series. Inclusion
of these alternate proxies does not substantively aﬀect our qualitative conclusions.
25Literature motivated by the search for conditions under which the Modigliani-Miller theorem, 1958 and
1963, might be violated directed our attention toward these alternate determinants of ﬁnancing decisions. See
Stiglitz, 1969, Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973, and Brander and Lewis, 1986. Because we are interested in
variations in ﬁnancing decisions between Canadian and U.S. ﬁrms, and the tax treatment of debt and equity
has been similar over most of our period of study in the two countries, we do not investigate the possibility
that diﬀerences in Canadian and U.S. corporate taxation have been responsible for diﬀerences in the observed
ﬁnance decisions. For more detail on the tax treatment of debt and equity in Canada, see Gillespie, 1991, or
Perry, 1989.
15Table 5: Firm Speciﬁc Characteristics, Macroeconomic Performance and Industry Performance
Canada U.S.
(σ) (σ)
Gross Output 8621.8 11491.2
(776.7) (2392.1)
Market Share 0.019 0.217
(0.008) (0.176)
Aggregate Capital Share 0.016 0.201
(0.009) (0.173)
Firm Age 34.4 42.6
(22.5) (25.6)
Years in Financial Distress 17.25 19.14
(8.221) (3.716)
Expected GNP Growth 0.040 0.035
(0.005) (0.011)
Shocks to Expected GNP Growth −9.70e−11 7.80e−10
(0.169) (0.180)
Expected Relative Price Growth 0.002 0.005
(0.014) (0.009)
Shocks to Expected Relative Price Growth 2.23e−10 −3.07e−10
(0.101) (0.157)
Note 1: Unweighted arithmetic averages across all years and ﬁrms, by nation, σ =Standard Deviation.
Note 2: Gross Output=(net revenue/nominal output price), Market Share=ﬁrm share of aggregate gross
output, Aggregate Capital Share=ﬁrm share of aggregate capital employed, Age=(current year - year of
incorporation), Financial Distress=(Wk - government bond yield) ≤ 0, Expected GNP Growth=average over
next 5 years, Shocks to Expected GNP Growth=deviations from expectations in current year, Expected
Relative Price Growth=average growth rate of nominal output price/WPI over next 5 years, Shocks to
Expected Relative Price Growth=deviations from expectations in current year.
observed diﬀerences in ﬁnancing decisions. We have performed the formal statistical test for
domestically unique ﬁnancing decisions using three diﬀerent ﬁrm size control variables; gross
output (the ﬁrms’ net revenue deﬂated by an industry speciﬁc nominal output price index),
market share (the ﬁrms’ gross output divided by the sum of the gross output of all eleven ﬁrms
included in our sample), and the proportion of aggregate industry capital employed (the ﬁrms’
real capital input divided by the sum of the real capital inputs of all eleven ﬁrms included in
our sample).26 From Table 5 we can see that the U.S. steel producers were more than ten
times the size of their Canadian counterparts, on average.
In addition to size, longevity is an important determinant of reputation and perceived
performance. Therefore, we have included the ﬁrms’ ages as a control variable in our system
26Our ﬁrst size variable measures the aggregate size of each ﬁrm. It is dependent on annual market ﬂuctua-
tions. Our second size variable measures the relative size of each ﬁrm, and is less dependent on annual market
ﬂuctuations. Our third size variable provides an alternate relative size measure that is even less dependent on
annual market ﬂuctuations.
16of equations to test the possibility that the older producers have been favoured on more formal,
stable capital markets. Age has been measured as the diﬀerence between the date of each ﬁrm’s
ﬁrst incorporation under its own name and the current year.27 From Table 5 we can see that
the U.S. steel producers were 8.2 years older than the Canadian ﬁrms, on average.
The characteristics of the domestic capital markets, the size of the ﬁrms and the age of the
ﬁrms are possible supply side determinants of the ﬁnancial ratios. We have also considered
demand side determinants. In particular, a ﬁrm’s ability to pay its capital owners at least the
domestic, risk-free government bond yield not only acts as a proxy for investors’ perceptions
of the ﬁrm (assuming lenders have perfect foresight), but it also identiﬁes periods of ﬁnancial
distress for the ﬁrms. During these times of distress it was typical for the ﬁrms to rely
very heavily on retained earnings for a short period. As the ﬁrms emerged from times of
distress they reverted to a more “typical” mix of ﬁnancial instruments. To control for atypical
ﬁnancial behaviour during times of distress we have included in our system of equations a
dummy variable that takes the value one during the years in which the ﬁrms’ ex post capital
costs were less than, or equal to the domestic government bond yield. Most of the ﬁrms in
the sample were in ﬁnancial distress during the ﬁrst half of the 1930s and the early years of
the 1980s. From Table 5 we can see that the U.S. ﬁrms experienced an additional 1.89 years
of ﬁnancial distress, on average.28
Another demand side determinant we consider is the presence of government ownership.
Government ownership may distort the proﬁt motivation underlying the ﬁnancing decisions
made by privately owned ﬁrms. In general, because the identity of shareholders is never re-
vealed, we have no way of determining the extent of public ownership of any of the ﬁrms in our
sample. However, we do know that in 1970 a provincial crown corporation; Sidbec; purchased
a controlling interest in Dosco, the smallest of the Canadian ﬁrms. Throughout the period
of public control (1970-1990) there was a wide range of government intervention in Dosco’s
operations, including direct subsidies, tax expenditures, regional development grants, and in-
vestment aid. Dosco’s ﬁnancing decisions changed quite dramatically in 1970, particularly its
use of retained earnings.29 Because it is possible that a publicly controlled ﬁrm’s incentives
27In some cases, Algoma for example, data are only available after a major reorganization, merger or initial
public oﬀering of debt or equity. The age variable acts as a ﬁrm speciﬁc, rather than nation speciﬁc time trend.
28Since our sample is unbalanced, the average number of years in ﬁnancial distress is slightly misleading. The
U.S. ﬁrms in our sample were in ﬁnancial distress an average of 25.1% of the time. The Canadian ﬁrms in our
sample were in ﬁnancial distress an average of 27.2% of the time.
29A standard Chow test conﬁrms that there was a statistically signiﬁcant discontinuity in Dosco’s retained
earnings-assets ratio in 1970.
17Table 6: Testing for Statistically Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences in Financial Instruments, Conditional
on Firm Speciﬁc Characteristics and Capital Market Characteristics
Test 5: c βx Test 6: c βx
(P Value) (P Value)
Short Term Debt/Assets: 0.021 -0.012
(0.127) (0.226)
Long Term Debt/Assets: -0.019 -0.037
(0.317) (0.106)
Retained Earnings/Assets: -0.004 -0.007
(0.832) (0.805)
Capital Stock/Assets: -0.057 0.047
(0.004) (0.114)
Note: A statistically signiﬁcant parameter estimate indicates domestically unique ﬁnancial ratios after
controlling for ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics and capital market characteristics.
Test 4: Controlling for market share, ﬁrm age, ﬁnancial distress, and public ownership.
Test 5: Controlling for market share, public ownership, corporate bond and stock issues, bank assets, life
insurance company assets, and an aggregate risk premium.
and optimization problem may be diﬀerent from its privately owned counterparts, Dosco may
be responsible for the statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the Canadian and the U.S.
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. In our system of four equations we have included a public owner-
ship dummy, taking the value one for Dosco during the years 1970-1990, to control for this
possibility.
In Test 5 we control for the four ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics; size30, age, ﬁnancial distress
and Dosco’s public ownership after 1970. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
Canadian and the U.S. ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios, but insigniﬁcant diﬀerences in the
Canadian and the U.S. short term debt-assets, long term debt-assets and retained earnings-
assets ratios. This suggests that, like the capital market characteristics, the ﬁrm speciﬁc
characteristics can account for only a sub-set of the observed diﬀerences in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing
decisions. The estimated parameters on candum0
t, and their p values, from the equation system
with ﬁrm speciﬁc controls are reported as Test 5 in Table 6.
In addition to the ﬁrm speciﬁc variables, we have controlled for the inﬂuence of macroeco-
nomic determinants of the ﬁrms’ balance sheet composition. Firms form expectations about
future market conditions, and they experience shocks to these expectations. If a ﬁrm is ex-
pecting particularly strong, or weak, market growth and industry performance, this may aﬀect
their choice of ﬁnance instrument. We would expect that greater uncertainty, greater volatil-
ity, or simply reductions in expected revenue, to encourage an increase in the ﬁrms’ reliance
30We report only the results from the use of the market share measure of ﬁrm size.
18on short term and informal sources of capital ﬁnancing, particularly retained earnings.
We have modelled the formation of the steel producers’ macroeconomic expectations using
an AR(3) process to predict domestic G.N.P. ﬁve years into the future.31 We then use the
predicted G.N.P. to derive the expected average growth rate over the next ﬁve years, and we
estimate shocks to these expectations as the amount by which the observed current G.N.P.
deviates from the predicted current G.N.P.. From Table 5 we can see that the U.S. steel
producers were slightly less optimistic about domestic G.N.P. growth rates, relative to their
Canadian counterparts, and they tended to slightly under-estimate future G.N.P..
We have controlled for the possibility that diﬀerences in the average expected growth
rates of domestic G.N.P., and shocks to these expectations, explain the observed diﬀerences
in ﬁnancing decisions. There remains a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Canadian
and U.S. short term debt-assets, long term debt-assets and retained earnings-assets ratios, but
no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Canadian and U.S. ﬁnancial capital stock-assets
ratios, after controlling for diﬀerences in aggregate expectations and shocks.
We have repeated this test using nominal output prices for the steel industries, relative to
domestic wholesale price indices as industry performance proxies. The average expected growth
rate of relative prices, and shocks to these expectations, reﬂect the predicted performance of
the steel industry alone, rather than the performance of the aggregate economy. Again, we
have modelled the formation of the steel producers’ expectations using an AR(3) process to
predict their relative output prices ﬁve years into the future.32 We then use the predicted
relative prices to derive the expected average growth rate over the next ﬁve years. The shocks
in relative prices are again assumed to be current deviations from the predictions. From Table
5 we can see that the U.S. steel producers were slightly more optimistic about the growth
of domestic relative output prices, but they tended to slightly over-estimate future industry
performance.
We have controlled for the possibility that diﬀerences in average expected relative price
growth, and shocks to these expectations, explain the observed diﬀerences in ﬁnancing de-
cisions. Like the macroeconomic variables, the industry performance variables do not have
any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the cross border diﬀerences in the short or long term
31At any standard level of statistical signiﬁcance we can reject the hypothesis that the Canadian and the U.S.
expectations and shocks were identical.
32At any standard level of statistical signiﬁcance we can reject the hypothesis that the Canadian and the U.S.
expectations and shocks were identical.
19debt-assets ratios, but they do have a small eﬀect on the retained earnings-assets ratios.
At this point we can conclude that there does not appear to have been a single set of
determinants that can explain all of the observed diﬀerences between the ﬁnancing decisions
made by the U.S. and Canadian ﬁrms. This does not necessarily imply that the determinants
we have identiﬁed have not played any role in the ﬁrms’ decision making processes. We only
suggest that the choice among ﬁnancial instruments is a complicated one, that cannot be
attributed to a single factor. Indeed, after controlling for diﬀerences between two ﬁrm speciﬁc
characteristics; market share and public ownership; and ﬁve capital market characteristics;
corporate bank loans, bond market and stock market activity, the size of the life insurance
sector and a risk premium; there remain no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
U.S. and Canadian short term debt-assets, long term debt-assets, retained earnings-assets or
ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios. We suggest that this combination of determinants can
explain all of the observed diﬀerences between the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. The estimated
parameters on candum0
t, and their p values, from the all encompassing Test 6 are reported in
Table 6.
5 Realized Capital Costs and Balance Sheet Composition
The evidence described in Sections 2, 3 and 4 supports the suggestion that U.S. and Canadian
capital markets had some domestically unique features over the 1910-1990 period, that the
U.S. and the Canadian steel ﬁrms’ made domestically unique capital ﬁnancing decisions over
this same period, and that there was at least a tentative connection between the observed
diﬀerences in capital markets and the observed diﬀerences in balance sheet composition. In
this section we investigate the ﬁnal facet of our argument; we test for common capital costs
among the U.S. and the Canadian steel ﬁrms in our sample, and we test the strength of the
relationship between the ﬁrms’ capital costs and the composition of their balance sheets.
To raise funds through the issuance of debt or equity a ﬁrm must be able to pay a return
per dollar of capital employed that is a positive function of the risk and transaction costs faced
by potential lenders, and the presence of economic rents. The pressures forcing a speciﬁc ﬁrm’s
capital costs to deviate from the corporate average may come through two channels. First,
lenders may be able to discriminate among borrowers on the basis of their risk and ability to
generate economic rents. This implies that safe, stable borrowers, operating in competitive,
rent-free environments will pay a lower return than the corporate average. Although one
20expects to observe this discrimination among borrowers in external-formal capital markets,
such as bond and stock markets, it is more likely to be both dramatic and ﬁrm speciﬁc in
internal-informal capital markets, such as retained earnings and short term debt.
The second channel through which a ﬁrm’s capital costs may deviate from the corporate
average results from the eﬃciency-information cost trade-oﬀ ﬁrms must make when choosing
among the sources for their funds. From ﬁnance theory we know that ﬁrms rank their potential
sources for capital on the basis of their ability to access these funds and the returns they
must pay for the funds.33 This ranking stems from the ﬁrms’ desire to trade-oﬀ the cost of
information provision against the eﬃciency of the various capital markets. The theory predicts
that ﬁrms will pay relatively high returns to internal-informal sources until they are able to
aﬀord the information costs associated with the relatively low returns paid on external-formal
bond and stock markets. Therefore, ﬁrms with relatively high transactions costs may be forced
rely more heavily on retained earnings and short term debt, and therefore, pay capital costs
in excess of the corporate average.
Because of the nature of the banking sectors and securities markets in the U.S. and Canada,
in conjunction with the industrial, tariﬀ and tax policies of Canadian and U.S. governments,
and the oligopolistic market structure of the steel industry in both countries, it is likely that the
ﬁrms in our sample faced imperfectly competitive capital markets, had substantial transactions
costs, and enjoyed some input or output market power over the 1910-1990 period. Therefore,
we should not be surprised that the ﬁrms in our sample paid rates of return that diﬀered from
the average corporate rates of return, or that the ﬁrms’ capital costs were related to their
ﬁnancing decisions.
Ideally we would like to be able to determine each ﬁrms’ source speciﬁc costs of capital.
Unfortunately, given our data this is not feasible. However, it is feasible to determine the
average payments made to all sources of capital by each ﬁrm, in each year. We have calculated
these ex post capital costs; Wk; as each ﬁrms’ variable proﬁt; total revenue less sales taxes,
excise taxes, labour costs and intermediate input costs; divided by a measure of the current
value of each ﬁrms’ ﬁxed capital stock.34 This measure represents the average return paid to
the owners of the ﬁrms’ capital, and as such it is equivalent to the actual cost of each dollar
of capital employed, regardless of its source.
33Myers and Majluf, 1984, introduced this “pecking order theory” of corporate ﬁnance.
34For greater detail on sources and construction, see Keay, 1999, Data Appendix in Chapter 2.
21Table 7: Canadian and U.S. Capital Costs
Canada U.S.
(σ) (σ)
Government Bond Yield 0.054 0.047
(0.031) (0.026)
Corporate Bond Yield 0.069 0.055
(0.027) (0.029)




Wk - Gov’t Bond Yield 0.053 0.065
(0.072) (0.078)
Wk - Corp. Bond Yield 0.036 0.057
(0.074) (0.080)
Wk - Corp. Stock Yield 0.058 0.066
(0.059) (0.059)
Note 1: Unweighted arithmetic averages across years and ﬁrms, σ =Standard Deviation.
Note 2: Government bond yield = average annual, long term.
Note 3: Corporate bond yield = Moody’s average annual, AAA.
Note 4: Corporate stock yield = common stocks’ dividend : price ratio.
Note 5: Wk = variable proﬁt/current value ﬁxed capital, Wk - government bond yield = Wkprem1, Wk -
corporate bond yield = Wkprem2, Wk - corporate stock yield = Wkprem3.
Insert Figure 11-14
Figure 11 illustrates the annual ex post-realized capital costs, averaged across the ﬁrms
in each nation. We can see that, although the series are closely and positively correlated
throughout the entire 1910-1990 period, after World War 2 U.S. ex post capital costs have
been fairly consistently greater than Canadian ex post capital costs.35 Figures 12, 13 and 14
illustrate Canadian and U.S. long term government bond yields, average corporate bond yields
and average corporate stock yields, respectively, over the years 1900-1990. The Canadian and
U.S. returns on these external-formal capital markets were closely and positively correlated
for all three series, with Canadian government and corporate bond yields being consistently
higher, while U.S. stock yields tended to be lower than Canadian until the mid-1960s, but
higher through most of the 1965-1990 period.
Table 7 reports unweighted arithmetic averages and standard deviations for long term
35Collins and Williamson, 2001, Table 2, illustrate that Canadian construction, machinery, and equipment
prices have been substantially higher than U.S. prices since 1850. Keay, 2000B, Table 3, and Wylie, 1989, Pg.
576, argue that costs per unit of capital employed have been substantially higher among Canadian manufactur-
ers, relative to U.S. manufacturers throughout the twentieth century. This implies that relatively low purchase
prices have more than oﬀset the relatively high rates of return paid by U.S. producers during the twentieth
century.
22U.S. and Canadian government bond yields, average corporate bond yields, average corporate
common stocks’ dividend : price ratios, and the seven U.S. ﬁrms’ and four Canadian ﬁrms’
ex post capital costs. The average diﬀerence between each ﬁrms’ ex post capital costs and
government bond yields, corporate bond yields and corporate stock yields are also reported
for the U.S. and Canadian ﬁrms.
The Canadian steel ﬁrms paid 0.7% less on an average dollar of capital employed than their
U.S. counterparts over the 1910-1990 period, at the mean of the data. This was despite the
fact that the returns paid on external-formal capital markets were higher in Canada. Between
1910-1990, Canadian long term government bond yields were 0.7% higher, average corporate
bond yields were 1.4% higher and average common stock yields were 0.1% higher, relative to
U.S. yields, at the mean of the data. When aggregated across all sources, both the U.S. and
Canadian ﬁrms paid more than the average corporate bond and stock rates of return for their
capital, but the U.S. ﬁrms had to pay higher returns and substantially higher premia over the
average corporate yields. The U.S. steel producers paid an additional 1.2% over government
bond yields, 2.1% over average corporate bond yields and 0.8% over average corporate stock
yields, at the mean of the data. The higher U.S. ex post capital costs must stem from relatively
high risk and rent premia extracted by lenders, particularly internal-informal lenders, and/or
greater reliance on high capital cost, but low transactions cost sources.
To conﬁrm our impressions derived from Figure 11 and Table 7, we have formally tested
for statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the U.S. and Canadian capital costs. Despite
the fact that simple correlation coeﬃcients between the Canadian and the U.S. series range
from 0.648 to 0.976, we ﬁnd that the mean ex post capital costs, ex post capital cost premia,
government bond yields and corporate bond yields have been statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
in Canada and the U.S. over most of the twentieth century, with at least 95% conﬁdence.36
These are not the results we would expect to observe if Canadian producers have been at
a disadvantage due to the immature and undeveloped nature of their domestic capital market.
However, these results are consistent with the view that the U.S. capital market may have
been eﬃcient, but ﬁrms that did not exploit its unique features, such as its large, formal stock
markets, could ﬁnd themselves paying relatively high capital costs. We can formally test the
possibility that the steel ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions were having a signiﬁcant eﬀect on their
36We can reject the null that Canadian and U.S. common stock yields were identical with no more than 65%
conﬁdence.
23capital costs.
Using equation by equation generalized least squares, with explicit controls for cross-panel
heteroskedasticity and within panel autocorrelation (where necessary), we have regressed the
natural logarithm of the ﬁrm speciﬁc ex post capital costs on a constant and the natural log-
arithm of the ﬁrm speciﬁc short term debt-assets ratios, multiplied by nation speciﬁc dummy
variables.37 We have repeated the exercise using the long term debt-assets, retained earnings-
assets and ﬁnancial capital stock-assets ratios as independent variables. The presence of sta-
tistically signiﬁcant parameter estimates on the ﬁnancial ratios suggests support for claims of
a connection between balance sheet composition and capital costs. The parameter estimates
associated with each ﬁnancial ratio also represent the elasticity of ex post capital costs with
respect to these ratios.
lnWkijt = C10 +cda
st (candumjt × ln(Sterm/Assets)ijt) (10)
+ us
st (usdumjt × ln(Sterm/Assets)ijt) + e10t
lnWkijt = C11 +cda
lt (candumjt × ln(Lterm/Assets)ijt) (11)
+ us
lt (usdumjt × ln(Lterm/Assets)ijt) + e11t
lnWkijt = C12 +cda
re (candumjt × ln(RE/Assets)ijt) (12)
+ us
re (usdumjt × ln(RE/Assets)ijt) + e12t
lnWkijt = C13 +cda
ks (candumjt × ln(Kstk/Assets)ijt) (13)
+ us
ks (usdumjt × ln(Kstk/Assets)ijt) + e13t
Table 8 reports the estimated elasticity of ex post capital costs with respect to the ﬁnancial
ratios for each country, and the statistical signiﬁcance of these estimates. We can see that, in
general, the elasticity estimates are quite small, ranging in absolute value from 0.102 to 0.334.
It is also apparent that the ﬁrms from both nations experienced falling ex post capital costs
when they increased their use of formal capital instruments; long term debt, and common
and preferred shares; and rising ex post capital cost when they increased their use of informal
capital instruments; short term debt and retained earnings.
The results reported in Table 8 may be muted because ex post capital costs capture the
average corporate rates of return from bond and stock markets, which are exogenous from
37candumt takes the value one for the four Canadian ﬁrms and the value zero otherwise. usdumt takes the
value one for the seven U.S. ﬁrms and the value zero otherwise.
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Canada U.S.
(P Value) (P Value)
c st 0.162 0.168
(0.006) (0.000)
c lt -0.183 -0.189
(0.001) (0.000)
c re 0.334 0.277
(0.000) (0.000)
c ks -0.210 -0.102
(0.001) (0.097)
Note 1: See equations (10) - (13) in text.
Note 2: st = %∆Wk/%∆st,lt = %∆Wk/%∆lt,re = %∆Wk/%∆re,ks = %∆Wk/%∆ks.
Note 3: st = short term debt/assets, lt = long term debt/assets, re = retained earnings/assets, ks = ﬁnancial
capital stock/assets.
each individual ﬁrms’ point of view, and the average premia paid in excess of these returns.
We would not expect each ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions to have any eﬀect on the average rate
of return paid on all corporate bonds or stocks, but we should expect the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing
decisions to have an eﬀect on the premia paid in excess of these average rates of return. In
an eﬀort to isolate the endogenous component of ex post capital costs, we have repeated our
formal statistical tests with the inclusion of the natural logarithm of the premia paid by the
ﬁrms in excess of the long term government bond yield; lnWkprem1ijt = lnWkijt−lnGovtijt;
the average corporate bond yield; lnWkprem2ijt = lnWkijt − lnBondijt; and the average
corporate stock yield; lnWkprem3ijt = lnWkijt − lnStkijt; as dependent variables.
lnWkpremijt = C14 +ηcda
st (candumt × ln(Sterm/Assets)ijt) (14)
+ ηus
st (usdumt × ln(Sterm/Assets)ijt) + e14t
lnWkpremijt = C15 +ηcda
lt (candumt × ln(Lterm/Assets)ijt) (15)
+ ηus
lt (usdumt × ln(Lterm/Assets)ijt) + e15t
lnWkpremijt = C16 +ηcda
re (candumt × ln(RE/Assets)ijt) (16)
+ ηus
re (usdumt × ln(RE/Assets)ijt) + e16t
lnWkpremijt = C17 +ηcda
ks (candumt × ln(Kstk/Assets)ijt) (17)
+ ηus
ks (usdumt × ln(Kstk/Assets)ijt) + e17t
Table 9 reports the elasticity of the capital cost premia with respect to the short term
debt-assets, long term debt-assets, retained earnings-assets and ﬁnancial capital stock-assets
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Wkprem1 Wkprem2 Wkprem3
Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
(P Value) (P Value) (P Value) (P Value) (P Value) (P Value)
c ηst 0.315 0.191 0.466 0.297 0.116 0.044
(0.004) (0.024) (0.000) (0.001) (0.212) (0.533)
c ηlt -0.017 -0.301 -0.023 -0.202 -0.087 -0.191
(0.869) (0.001) (0.828) (0.023) (0.277) (0.008)
c ηre 0.563 0.225 0.869 0.375 0.358 0.369
(0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.001)
d ηks -0.029 -0.072 -0.052 -0.136 -0.200 -0.120
(0.828) (0.519) (0.685) (0.269) (0.031) (0.206)
Note 1: See equations (14) - (17) in text.
Note 2:
ηst = %∆Wkprem/%∆st,ηlt = %∆Wkprem/%∆lt,ηre = %∆Wkprem/%∆re,ηks = %∆Wkprem/%∆ks.
ratios. We can draw two conclusions from these estimated elasticities. First, the isolation
of the endogenous component of ex post capital costs has very little eﬀect on the qualitative
conclusions that ﬂowed from our consideration of Table 8, regardless of how we deﬁne the
premia. All of the signs on the estimated elasticities remain the same, the estimates remain
quantitatively small, and the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated elasticities do not change
dramatically, with the exception of ηks for all three Canadian and U.S. premia, and ηlt for
all three Canadian premia. Our second conclusion is that, despite the fact that the ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial ratios have, in general, been statistically signiﬁcant determinants of capital costs and
capital cost premia, there remains a large unexplained portion of the ﬁrms’ returns paid per
dollar of capital employed.
We can perform a rough counterfactual experiment in an eﬀort to determine the extent to
which diﬀerences in the composition of the U.S. and Canadian steel producers’ balance sheets
can explain diﬀerences in their capital costs. If we assume that our estimated elasticities are
ﬁxed and we allow the U.S. ﬁrms to adopt the Canadian ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial ratios, we would
observe virtually no change in U.S. ex post capital costs, or capital cost premia, at the mean
of the data.
If the U.S. ﬁrms had mirrored the Canadian producers ﬁnancial decisions, their ex post
capital costs would have increased by 9.05%, at the mean of the data. This result is driven
by the fact that, even though the U.S. counterfactual capital costs would have fallen had they
adopted the Canadian ﬁrms’ equity ﬁnancing, they would have risen by even more if they had
adopted the Canadian ﬁrms’ higher short term debt-assets ratios, and lower long term debt-
26assets ratios. Even if we assume the most favourable balance sheet composition for the U.S.
ﬁrms; the retention of U.S. debt ﬁnancing with the introduction of Canadian equity ﬁnancing;
the U.S. ﬁrms’ ex post capital costs would have fallen by just 2.18%, less than half of the
Canada-U.S. capital cost diﬀerential, at the mean of the data. When we perform our rough
counterfactual experiment with the three ex post capital cost premia we derive a similar result.
Had the U.S. steel producers adopted Canadian equity ﬁnancing while maintaining their own
debt ﬁnancing, their capital cost premia would have fallen by between 2.63% and 1.50%, less
than one sixth of diﬀerentials in Canada-U.S. capital cost premia. It is apparent that the
observed diﬀerences in balance sheet composition can account for very little of the observed
diﬀerences in capital costs, or capital cost premia.
6 Conclusions
Over the 1910-1990 period the structure and performance of the U.S. and Canadian aggregate
economies, steel industries and capital markets were very similar. Despite the similarities,
there were domestically unique features of the nations’ capital markets; banks were the largest
intermediaries in the U.S. and Canada, but the Canadian banking sector was more active in
corporate ﬁnance; U.S. stock exchanges dwarfed Canadian exchanges, but U.S. ﬁrms were not
as active in the issuance of equities as Canadian ﬁrms; and; U.S. ﬁrms were more active in
the issuance of bonds, relative to their Canadian competitors. These distinctive features of
the U.S. and Canadian capital markets had an impact on the sources of funds available for
investment among our sample of steel producers in the two countries.
U.S. steel ﬁrms used more long term debt, relative to short term debt, and more retained
earnings, relative to ﬁnancial capital stock, than Canadian steel ﬁrms during the 1910-1990
period. These diﬀerences in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structures reﬂected not only diﬀerences in the
nations’ banking sectors, and relatively active bond issuance and inactive share issuance in
the U.S., but also the relative size, age, ﬁnancial stability, and extent of private ownership of
the ﬁrms. The unique features of the steel ﬁrms’ balance sheets were, therefore, a (partial)
reﬂection of domestic capital market characteristics and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics.
The connection between capital markets and balance sheets is important because the com-
position of the ﬁrms’ balance sheets was a signiﬁcant determinant of the returns they paid on
each dollar of capital they have employed. When averaged across all sources, the U.S. ﬁrms
27paid slightly more per dollar of capital employed and substantially more in excess of govern-
ment bond yields, corporate bond yields and corporate stock yields, than the Canadian ﬁrms,
over the 1910-1990 period. Among both the U.S. and Canadian steel producers, increased
reliance on short term debt, relative to long term debt, and retained earnings, relative to
ﬁnancial capital stock, was associated with higher capital costs and capital cost premia.
The evidence presented in this paper, therefore, indicates that over most of the twentieth
century U.S. and Canadian capital markets had domestically unique features, U.S. and Cana-
dian steel ﬁrms’ balance sheets had domestically unique features, U.S. and Canadian steel
ﬁrms’ capital costs were not equal, and there were statistically signiﬁcant relationships among
the observed cross-border diﬀerences. However, statistical signiﬁcance does not imply that
the relationships among the variables were economically substantial; we cannot distinguish
between the U.S. and Canadian ﬁrms’ use of formal stock markets; we cannot control for all of
the observed balance sheet diﬀerences with variables describing national capital market char-
acteristics; and the vast majority of capital cost diﬀerentials between the U.S. and Canada
remain unaﬀected by changes in the composition of the ﬁrms’ balance sheets.
We are left with three conclusions. First, the underlying causes of the cross-border dif-
ferences in North American steel producers’ ﬁnancial ratios remain complicated and open to
various interpretations. Second, a substantial portion of the cross-border diﬀerences in North
American steel producers’ capital costs remains unexplained. These two conclusions imply
that, if we believe that the bridge between capital markets and industrialization is the choice
of ﬁnancial instruments and the cost of capital among manufacturing ﬁrms, then evidence
drawn from twentieth century U.S. and Canadian steel producers cannot support claims of an
economically important relationship. However, our ﬁnal conclusion focuses on the fact that
the quantitatively small connection between capital market characteristics, balance sheets and
capital costs from our comparison of two wealthy, industrialized nations, with very similar
industrial structure, technology, income and economic-cultural-legal institutions, is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcance of the connection in our case study suggests that these
relationships are likely to have been very robust, and substantially more important among
more diverse nations, industries, or time periods.
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